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THOMPSON v. OKLAHOMA
486 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 100 L.Ed.2d -, (1988)
FACTS
Petitioner, in concert with three older persons, actively par-
ticipated in a brutal murder when he was 15 years old. The
evidence disclosed that the victim had been shot twice, and that
his throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut. He also had
multiple bruises and a broken leg. His body had been chained
to a concrete block and thrown into a river where it remained
for almost four weeks. Each of the four participants was tried
separately and each was sentenced to death. Since petitioner was
considered a "child" as a matter of Oklahoma law, the District
Attorney filed a statutory petition with the trial court to have
him tried as an adult. The petition was granted and Thompson
was certified to stand trial as an adult. Thompson was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death.
HOLDING
Whether the "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition of
the Eighth Amendment made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the execution of a person
who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her
offense.
A plurality of the members of the Court, Justice Stevens
joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice
Blackmun, guided by the thinking in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) that "evolv-
ing standards of decency... mark the progress of a maturing
society," concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment applies to prohibit the ex-
ecution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time
of his or her offense.
The plurality examined state statutes, (particularly those of
the 18 states that have considered the question of a minimum
age for imposition of the death penalty, and have uniformly re-
quired that a defendant must have attained at least the age of
16 at the time of the capital offense to be eligible for the death
penalty) to support its conclusion that the imposition of the
death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhor-
rent to the conscience of the community.
Citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61
L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the plurality discussed the
accepted proposition that less culpability should attach to a
crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime com-
mitted by an adult. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687 at
2688. The reasons enumerated for this reduced culpability are
inexperience, less education and less intelligence which result in
the teenager being less able to evaluate the consequences of his
or her conduct, while at the same time leaving them more
vulnerable to peer pressure or more apt to be motivated by
mere emotion. Id.
Further in its analysis, the plurality quotes Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2929-30, 49 L.Ed.2d
859 (1976) "The death penalty is said to serve two principal
social purposes; retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by
prospective offenders." 108 S.Ct. at 2699. But the Court finds
that the aiplication of the death penalty to this class of of-
fenders does not measurably contribute to the essential purposes
underlying the penalty. Id. at 2689. Considering the lesser
culpability attributed to children, as well as the teenager's
capacity for growth and society's fiduciary obligations to its
children, the Court found the retributive purpose underlying the
death penalty simply inapplicable to the execution of a 15-year-
old offender. Moreover, the Court found the deterrence ra-
tionale for the penalty equally unacceptable with respect to such
offenders. Statistics demonstrate that the vast majority of per-
sons arrested for willful homicide are over 16 at the time of the
offense. Id. at 2688. The court reasoned, the likelihood that a
teenage offender has considered a cost-benefit analysis as to the
possibility of execution for his conduct is virtually non-existent
due to the small number of juveniles executed in the 20th cen-
tury. Id. The plurality concluded that the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was
under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment. She agreed
with both the plurality and the dissent on two fundamental pro-
positions: 1) That there is some age below which a juvenile's
crimes can never be constitutionally punished by death, and 2)
that precedents require this age to be determined in light of the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." (Id. at 2691 quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958).
Although Justice O'Connor expressed her view that a na-
tional consensus forbidding the execution of any person for a
crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does exist, she
was "reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of constitu-
tional law without better evidence than we now possess." 108
S.Ct. at 2706.
Although statistics support the inference of a national con-
sensus opposing the death penalty for 15-year-olds, Justice
O'Connor feels they are not dispositive. O'Connor complained
that the statistics relied on by the plurality do not indicate how
many juries have been asked to impose the death penalty for
crimes committed below the age of 16 or how many times pro-
secutors have exercised their discretion to refrain from seeking
the death penalty in cases where statutory prerequisites might
have been proved. Id. at 2708. Without such data, said O'Con-
nor, raw execution and sentencing statistics cannot allow the
Court reliably to infer that juries are or would be significantly
more reluctant to impose the death penalty on 15-year-olds than
on similarly situated older defendants. Id.
O'Connor recognized the special qualitative characteristics of
juveniles that justify legislatures in treating juveniles differently
from adults and admitted that this factor is relevant to Eighth
Amendment proportionality analysis. However, she suggested
that these characteristics vary widely among different in-
dividuals of the same age, and that the court should not
substitute its inevitably subjective judgment about the best age
at which to draw a line in the capital punishment context for
the judgments of the nation's legislatures. Id. at 2709.
O'Connor declined to resolve the Eight Amendment question
and left it to be addressed in the first instance by the
legislatures. Id. at 2711. O'Connor acknowledged that
Oklahoma has enacted a statute that authorizes capital punish-
ment for murder, without setting any minimum age at which
the commission of murder may lead to the imposition of that
sentence. Id. That State has also, quite separately, provided that
15-year-old murder defendants may be treated as adults in some
circumstances. Id. Because the State proceeded in this manner,
there is a considerable risk that the Oklahoma legislature either
did not realize that its actions would have the effect of render-
ing 15-year-old defendants death-eligible or did not give the
question the serious consideration that would have been
reflected in the explicit choice of some minimum age for death-
eligibility. Id. Justice O'Connor concluded that petitioner and
others who were below the age of 16 at the time of their of-
fense may not be executed under the authority of a capital
punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execu
tion. Id.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
The Court's conclusion in Thompson, that petitioner and
others whose crimes were committed before the age of 16 may
not be executed pursuant to a capital punishment statute that
specifies no minimum age, applies directly to Virginia. No
minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty is express-
ly stated in the Virginia statutes relating to the death penalty.
(see Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31 and 19.2-264.2 to 19.264.5
(Repl. 1983 and Supp. 1987). In addition, §16.1-269(A) of the
Virginia Code provides that an offender may be waived from
juvenile to criminal court when charged with first-degree
murder. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269(A) (1982).
Although the opinion in Thompson was a plurality, with
Justice O'Connor concurring in the judgment only, O'Connor
seems to agree with the plurality that "petitioner and others
who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may
not be executed under the authority of a capital punishment
statute that specifies no minimum age at which the commission
of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution." 108
S.Ct. at 2711.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion leaves the Eighth
Amendment question to legislatures and does not conclude that
it is unconstitutional per se to execute any person who was
under the age of 16 at the time of the crime. However, until
legislatures address this issue squarely, it appears that a death
sentence for an offender who was 1) under the age of 16 at the
time of the offense and 2) tried in adult criminal court in a
state (such as Virginia) which has not set a minimum age for




The United States Constitution is the cornerstone on which
the country bases its conception of justice. The Eighth Amend-
ment forbids the use of "cruel or unusual punishment."
However, the definition of "cruel" and "unusual" is not a fix-
ed concept, it is based on "evolving standards of decency which
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The framers of the Constitution did not
perceive capital punishment as an unconstitutional penalty for
various criminal conduct. This is evidenced by the fact that the
Fifth Amendment due process clause speaks of deprivation of
"life." Under this framework the death penalty can be held un-
constitutional any time the United States Supreme Court decides
that "evolving standards of decency" mandate such a decision.
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court held the death
penalty, as administered by the states, unconstitutional on
Eighth Amendment procedural grounds. The Court's ruling in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) did not hold that the
death penalty, per se, violated the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution, but that the sentencing procedure ran a risk that
the death penalty would be administered in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. Furman at 242. By 1976 state legislatures
adopted two types of capital punishment statutes. The United
States Supreme Court held the mandatory death penalty statutes
unconstitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976). However, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's.
Florida's and Texas' guided jury discretion death penalty
statutes which substantially increased the "process" required to
convict a defendant to death, including a bifurcated trial com-
posed of a guilt stage and a penalty stage. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976),
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The sentencer must make
an individualized decision as to the appropriateness of the death
penalty in each case, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983),
and must consider any relevant mitigating factor which may
support a sentence of life. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978). The Court has required a higher level of reliability in a
death penalty sentencing stage than in other sentencing pro-
ceedings because of the unique nature of the death penalty.
Barefoot v. Estelle 463 U.S. 880, 924 (1983).
Substantively, the Supreme Court held that the sanction
must "comport with the basic concept of human dignity at the
core of the [Eighth] Amendment." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. In
deciding whether any punishment violates human dignity, the
Supreme Court stated that the state must have "penological
justification" for inforcing the punishment. Id. at 183. With
regard to the death penalty, the Court requires that the imposi-
tion of the penalty serves as retribution or deterrence of capital
crimes. Id. (See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
Ever since states have been actively enforcing the death
penalty, litigation has reflected the continuing struggle as socie-
ty attempts to find a just means to determine which criminals
are worthy of death. The United States Supreme Court has im-
posed both substantive and procedural limitations on the im-
position of the death penalty. These procedural and substantive
concerns outlined by the Supreme Court lead to the intricacy
and complexity of capital litigation. Many of these concerns are
directed primarily to insuring fairness at the trial level. In
subsequent articles we will address the remaining stages of the
capital case.
